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Abstract: In social-dilemma situations (e.g., public-good games), people may pursue their local self-
interests, thereby lowering the overall payoff of their group and, paradoxically, even their individual 
payoffs as a result. Likewise, in inner-individual dilemmas, even without conflict of interest between 
persons, people may pursue local goals at the expense of overall utility. Our experiments investigate 
such dissociations of individual and group-level effects in the context of personnel evaluation and 
selection. Participants were given the role of human resource managers selecting workers to optimize 
the overall payoff for the company. We investigated contexts where the individually best/worst 
‘employees’ systematically caused the worst/best group performance. When workers in a team could 
substantially increase or decrease co-workers’ performance, most participants (albeit not all) tended to 
focus solely on individual performance without considering their overall contribution even when 
instructed to maximize group performance. This undue focus on individual information meant that 
employees who enhanced team performance the most often received the most negative evaluations. 
This may result in a ‘tragedy of personnel evaluation’ relevant to maladaptive incentive structures 
(personnel evaluation), job offers (personnel selection), and a substantially negative impact on 
organizational effectiveness. At the same time, the results suggest ways this problem may be overcome. 
 Public Significance Statement: We investigate whether participants in the role of personnel 
managers who obtained information on both individual and team earnings readily take into account 
both individual and overall influences on group performance. We found participants neglected even 
large group-level effects. This raises important research questions and serves as a warning to 
practitioners in human resource management against a potentially tragic underestimation of those who 
are best overall for organisations and companies. 
Keywords: global vs. local optimization; personnel evaluation and selection; Simpson’s 
paradox; inner-individual dilemmas; altruist and egoist detection; teams; causal induction 
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Intra-Organizational Dilemmas:  
Conflicts between Individual-Level and Team-Level Optimization 
Adam Smith (1776) argued that altruism is not needed to promote the common good: “By pursuing 
his own interest he [the individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when 
he really intends to promote it.” In the wider context of evolutionary biology, philosophy, economics 
and psychology, however, it has been increasingly noted that social dilemmas can arise whereby groups 
of organisms or human agents individually maximising their self-interest (and in this sense acting 
‘optimally’) may not only lead to outcomes that are sub-optimal for the collective, but actually reduce 
the payoffs ultimately obtained by the individuals. For instance, it has been argued that the over-
exploitation and destruction of finite public resources by ‘rationally’ acting, selfish individuals is 
inevitable. This so-called “tragedy of the commons” has been discussed with regard to environmental 
pollution and sustainable development (Hardin, 1968). Social dilemmas, such as this, have been widely 
studied, and ensuing debates in behavioural economics and psychology have often concerned possible 
solutions to social dilemma situations. Research in various experimental paradigms has also eroded the 
expressed or tacit strict assumption of egoism, while still addressing problems and limits of altruism 
(Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich, 2005; 
Ostrom et al., 1999; Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016). Likewise, evolutionary biology and 
philosophy of biology have shifted from emphasizing individual egoism (or gene-egoism) to 
acknowledging multi-level approaches, which generally suggest the presence of egoistic as well as 
altruistic behaviour tendencies in social groups (Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Sober & Wilson, 1999; 
Wilson & Wilson, 2007; von Sydow, 2012).  
In companies and organizations, structural tensions between egoistic and group-serving behaviours 
have direct relevance as well (e.g., Dalal, 2005; George & Bettenhausen, 1990; Li, Kirkman, & Porter, 
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2014). The issue of egoistic and group-serving behaviours does not only raise moral questions 
regarding the common good of a society, but even arises within companies, even when the clear aim is 
to optimize key economic operating figures (e.g., net sales or operating profit). This may pose intra-
organizational dilemmas, with respect to building efficient organizations.  
One possible problem may arise with respect to personnel selection. A personnel manager, in the 
role of a neutral third party, may select people based on their individual (local) performance alone, 
ignoring their indirect effects on others and thus their overall effect on group performance. This may 
lead them to select teams that are clearly suboptimal.  
Likewise, an individual may pursue too many projects (local goals), each with a positive utility, but 
may thereby reduce overall utility (global goal) by ignoring these projects’ negative (or positive) 
external effects on other projects – that is, by ignoring interactions between these projects.  
These kinds of problems have been called “inner-individual” or “intra-individual” dilemmas (IID; 
von Sydow, 2015). Social dilemmas are situations in which agents who individually optimize their 
outcome decrease the group-level outcome and thereby also their own payoffs. An IID likewise 
involves local and global levels, but within a single individual’s payoff structure.  
From a game-theoretical perspective, however, social dilemmas and inner-individual dilemmas 
differ substantially. Whereas a  self-interested ‘optimal’ strategy in social dilemmas involves conflict of 
interests with others and should, game-theoretically, not lead  to the common good on a group level, the 
rational-choice solution to an IID clearly requires deciding for the globally optimal solution (without 
any resulting motivational tensions). One should clearly optimize one’s goals globally, and a personnel 
manager, as neutral third party, should quite clearly try to optimize the overall success of the company 
and thus refrain from selecting or rewarding employees with good individual operating figures if 
overall they are bad for the group, company or organization. Even for inner-individual dilemmas where 
the optimal solution clearly seems to be overall optimization, it has been shown that people may 
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sometimes optimize locally at the expense of the global level (von Sydow, 2015). The local-global 
distinction in inner-individual dilemmas perhaps resembles the tension between short-term (local) vs. 
long-term (global) utilities in delay of gratification or inter-temporal choice paradigms (Mischel, 
Shoda, & Peake, 1988, Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Curry, Price, & Price, 2008). If 
the findings on inner-individual dilemmas – that is, that people may sometimes perhaps simply not 
realize positive externalities of local effects – are transferable to a human resource management 
context, people should ignore interactions (e.g., the positive interactions of an altruist or the negative 
interactions of an egoist) with other employees. 
One related fundamental question of human factors research is whether people in the role of 
personnel managers can detect that high-performing teams are not necessarily those composed of the 
best performing individuals. Can they assemble the best performing group in circumstances where 
individual performances interact? We will address this question in an experimental setting exploring 
number-based performance evaluation in a task where we provide repeated information on both 
individual and group performance levels (in what we call a Two-Level Personnel Evaluation Tasks, T-
PETs).  
This question is important, since organisational psychology has increasingly stressed  importance of 
the role of inter- or super-individual factors, both under the heading of employee interactions and team 
performance. Research has acknowledged the role of teams beyond mere individual contributions 
(Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003; DeShon, Kozlowski, Schmidt, 
Milner, & Wiechmann, 2003; Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008; Mathieu, Tannenbaum, 
Donsbach, & Alliger, 2014; Chen, Farh, Campbell-Bush, Wu, & Wu, 2013; Memmert, Plessner, 
Hüttermann, Froese, Peterhänsel, & Unkelbach, 2015). Similarly there are also several notions linked 
to employees’ interactions with others or their environment; for instance, van Scotter & Motowidlo 
(1996) introduced the term “interpersonal facilitation” as a subcategory of contextual performance. Co-
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workers may interact in a variety of ways, including considerate, co-operative or helpful acts; or a co-
worker may catalyze higher performance, for instance by increasing the others’ motivation or by 
contributing to an atmosphere that enhances performance. In particular, the role of pro-social behaviour 
and altruism is increasingly understood to be important for functioning societies or smaller groups, in 
both psychology and behavioural economics (Engel, 2011; Hendrich et al., 2005; Gollwitzer, 
Rothmund, Pfeiffer, & Ensenbach, 2009; Post, 2005). Thus people’s ability to detect both anti- and pro-
social behaviours seems important. This is especially the case since organisational psychology has also 
begun to stress the role of prosocial or altruistic behaviours in teams (George & Bettenhausen, 1990; 
Beersma et al., 2003; Li, Kirkman, & Porter, 2014) as essential to the success of organizations and 
companies. In particular, organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB), concerned mostly with prosocial 
or altruistic behaviours not prescribed by role descriptions (or task descriptions; Organ, 1997) has 
become a flourishing field of research, finding reliable effects of OCB on productivity, efficiency, 
sales, revenue, reduced costs, customer satisfaction, and performance quality (Grant & Patil, 2012; 
Nielsen, Hrivnak, & Shaw, 2009; Organ & Ryan, 1995; Pearce & Herbik, 2004; Podsakoff, Whiting, 
Podsakoff, & Blume, 2009; Podsakoff, Whiting, Podsakoff, & Mishra, 2010). Nonetheless, some 
potentially dysfunctional effects also need mentioning (cf. Brief & Motowidlo, 1986). Advantages of 
adding team-level goals, motivations and incentives have been acknowledged (e.g., Chen & Kanfer, 
2006; Chen et al., 2013; DeShon et al., 2003), and the positive role of prosocial behaviour (or high 
“agreeableness”), at least in a ‘co-operative’ incentive structure, has been shown (Beersma et al., 
2003). Brief & Motowidlo (1986) have identified thirteen specific kinds of prosocial organizational 
behaviours that can be assumed mostly to improve performance. Prosocial interactions between 
employees in organizational contexts thus clearly occurs in many forms, and varies in several 
dimensions – for instance whether targeted at specific individuals or at larger organizational levels, 
whether role- or extra-role-behaviour, whether intentional or unintentional, or whether or not mediated 
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by actions, emotions or cognitions (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Li, Kirkman, & Porter, 2014). 
It is known that individuals’ performance can vary as a function of  team membership (Stewart & 
Nandkeolyar, 2007; cf. Mathieu et al., 2014). Hence the issue of detecting interactions between 
employees and altruists or egoists in particular needs further attention in Human resource management 
(Becker & Gerhart, 1996; Mathieu et al., 2014). Research has just begun to show that the 
acknowledged importance of group interactions and prosocial behaviour is at least sometimes reflected 
in personnel evaluation or selection. It has been suggested that in-role or extra-role prosocial behaviour 
is sometimes directly or indirectly rewarded by organizations (Organ, 1997; Scotter, Cross, & 
Motowidlo, 2000; Grant & Patil, 2012, 562). This suggests that managers at least in principle could 
recognize such behaviours. This may however be based in part on knowledge about moral attitudes of 
employees (cf. Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016), without considering performance data.  
Contempory performance data is often number-based. Such number-based evaluations may 
represent altruism (or prosocial behaviour) mathematically as a positive performance interaction with 
others and decreased individual performance (cf. Sober, 1998). So it is interesting how people deal with 
such contradicting performance data on the individual and group levels and how readily employers 
detect ‘value’ in contexts in which group and individual perspectives conflict. This is the gap that the 
present study seeks to address. We employ a basic number-based task and treat the varieties of  
interaction processes as “black box”, as is actually often done in outcome-based evaluations. 
Specifically, we investigate how people perceive an individual’s direct effect on team-earnings 
(individual level) relative to his or her overall effect, including all indirect effects on others.  
Specifically, we provide participants with cases in which these two levels are clearly dissociated. The 
task mirrors that of employee-analysis based on quantitative operating figures. Although we have 
doubts about whether an exclusively quantitative and performance-based personnel-evaluation is a 
viable approach to human resource management, units in large and middle-size organizations 
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increasingly base decisions on personnel information systems (PIS) and quantitative information only 
(Brandl, 2002). Thus our studies may also be interpreted as exploring potential consequences of this 
lack of qualitative data when people deal with quantitative performance on the individual and group or 
team levels only and do not have access to richer information about interactions about employees.  
People in charge of personnel-evaluation and incentive systems might tend, in number-based 
evaluations, to ignore distributed positive or negative effects of individuals on the work of other team 
members (externalities), concentrating only on a person’s direct operating figures. This would suggest 
a potential “tragedy of personnel selection”, since people with the best overall effects on group-
performance (e.g., by direct help or interpersonal facilitation) might be evaluated the most negatively.  
Two-Level Personnel Evaluation Tasks (T-PETs)  
The experiments here employ the same personnel evaluation or selection scenarios, involving a 
positive interactor (facilitator) or a negative interactor (inhibitor). The interacting employee who is 
individually the lowest (or highest) earner of a team, but who contributes the most (or least) overall to 
its success, is referred to here, somewhat simply, as “the altruist”, and the negative interactor as “the 
egoist”. One should note, however, that although altruists may often display patterns of lowered 
individual performance with increased group performance (in line with standard behavioural 
definitions of altruism; Sober, 1998), here information is given neither on the underlying motivation 
nor on whether the low individual performance of the altruist is caused by sacrificing in favour of the 
group.1 The same precautionary note is in place for the term “egoist”. 
                                                 
1 Even outside evolutionary biology the definition of altruism is sometimes purely behavioral, not requiring altruistic motives (see Li, 
Kirkman, & Porter, 2014). We do not generally endorse this terminologically position, but mainly use the terminology here for mnemonic 
reasons. Moreover, altruism will at least often lead to this structure. Even if the term ‘facilitator’ may perhaps be more appropriate, we 
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Thus the evaluation of the interactor should differ at the individual and the overall-group levels. 
Participants assume the role of human resource managers, evaluating the utility of employees in a local 
snack bar of a chain. A manager obtains daily information on direct earnings of individuals and on 
overall earnings of the shifts (changing teams of four employees). The observed overall profit strongly 
depends positively (or negatively) on the presence of one specific individual employee in a shift (r = 
.99, p < .001), suggesting that, despite having the lowest (highest) individual contribution, his or her 
presence substantially affects the others’ (and thus the team’s) outcome.  
The aim was to see how far the participants (as human resources managers) considered the partly 
indirect overall monetary contributions of the “altruist“ (or “egoist”) when evaluating their workers. In 
all experiments here we study simple examples in which an interactor has a positive (or negative) effect 
on all members of a group (or on the team as a whole). This is assumed by influential biological 
models of altruism (Sober & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & Wilson, 2007; but cf. Nowak & Sigmund, 1998, 
2005; Kiyonari & Barcley, 2008; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009) and reflects the 
notion of overall group-level effects, for instance, of team motivation, team goals, team climate, 
cohesion, collective cognition, leadership, and group identity (DeShon et al., 2003; Mathieu et al., 
2008, 2014; Haslam et al., 2017). Moreover, in the personnel management context, we focus on only 
one altruist (or egoist) who has a large impact on a relatively small group. Even though many real-life 
examples may involve larger groups, more interactors, or a more subtle impact of the interactor, it 
seemed interesting to explore first whether personnel managers had problems detecting strong group 
level effects in a relatively simple setting.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
kept the more specific notion ‘altruist’ as metonym, because it is the common term linked to the presumably most important 
exemplification of designated class.  
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Exploratory T-PET  
In a first exploratory T-PET study (reported in von Sydow & Braus, 2016), we looked at the general 
question of whether people detect more quickly the individual contribution or the overall group-level 
contribution of an ‘altuist’ in the above sense, and whether they realise the strength of the altruists’ 
indirect impact on the overall group earnings. The study had a 2 x 2 (rounds: 10 working days, versus 
20 working days; and low versus high impact of the altruist on earnings of the normal workers; with 
positive correlations r = .96, r = .99, both p < .001 in 10 rounds; see Table 1), within-subjects design. 
 
Table 1. Mean earnings of normal workers (NW) and altruist (A); and mean overall earnings with or 
without altruist in a pretest study (N = 124, MTurk) 
 Condition 1 / 2 
Small Impact of A 
Condition 3 / 4 
Large Impact of A 
NW without A   2200 €   2000 € 
NW with A   2800 €   3000 € 
Altruist    1600 €   1600 € 
Overall without A   8800 €   8000 € 
Overall with 
altruist 
10000 € 10600 € 
 
 
Participants in a computerized experiment were asked to imagine being a human resources manager 
evaluating the staff of a particular snack bar. In the computer scenario there are five staff members, but 
each day only four are working. Compared to many real personnel-evaluation situations, this five-
persons scenario is relatively simple (von Sydow, 2015, for a plausible inner-individual dilemma with 
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ten rather than five ‘variables’ in a different context). Participants in this personnel evaluation scenario 
were instructed to establish which workers contributed most to the company’s overall profit, based on 
data provided by the reporting unit of the larger company. After reading the instructions, participants 
received information regarding the per-day individual earnings of the four employees (along with their 
photographs), followed by total group earnings (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Example of shown earnings at the individual and group levels on a particular day. 
 
The earnings of both the normal workers and the altruist worker in each shift were based on the 
mean earnings shown in Table 1. This value was presented with some noise surrounding each value (a 
normal distribution with SD = 600 €). This nonetheless left the group effect of the altruist the dominant 
effect. The altruist role was randomly assigned to one of the pictures and randomly appeared in 6 of 10 
rounds (days) with the remaining normal workers for that shift also selected  at random (thus on 
average 7.5 times in 10 rounds). Participants could view the overview panels for each day as long as 
they wanted. After the 10 (or, in the extended practice condition, 20) rounds, the ‘human resources 
managers’ evaluated the employees of the snack bar in several tasks. The results showed that, in all 
conditions, a clear majority of participants judged the altruist as having not the highest but the lowest 
“overall utility for the company”, although clearly being the most highly associated with overall utility. 
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Additionally, there was a small but reliable increase in group-oriented judgments in the high-group-
impact conditions. Rating tasks likewise showed that the altruist was generally rated lower than the 
normal workers. We also coded the comments of the participants, and interestingly only 10 of the 124 
mentioned interaction between participants or different effects on the individual or group level; as, for 
instance: “It is always important to look beyond what is obvious. Like in this task wherein at first 
glance the girl with short hair and blue shirt seemed to be lagging behind; but after careful scrutiny, she 
is obviously leading the group. It may be affecting her individual performance, but the group's earnings 
is way high[er] when she is around.” Or: “The blonde lady with short hair seemed to encourage people 
to do a better job with sales. Even though her numbers weren't high she drastically increased the days’ 
sales.“  Such insightful comments correlated in the exploratory study, for instance, with judging the 
altruist to be of highest utility for the company (r = .347, p < .001). 
Nonetheless, the altruist was evaluated most negatively by the vast majority of participants. This 
exploratory study suggests that most participants, at least after 10 or 20 rounds, clearly tend to evaluate 
workers in a T-PET, not based on the overall strong correlation between presence of a worker and 
overall team earnings, but mostly rather based on their individual earnings alone.   
Overview of experiments  
The experiments that we report on more fully here explore further this potential neglect of taking the 
overall utility of a worker into account, and more generally how people in the role of personnel 
manager deal with conflicting number-based evidence on the individual and group level.  
Since the preliminary study showed that participants quickly base their judgments on individual and 
not on overall payoffs, Experiment 1a used a higher number of observations and introduces repeated 
test phases to explore whether this phenomenon is stable over time. Moreover, it extends the scenario 
to the wider field of personnel management by adding a two-level personnel selection task (here treated 
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as a special kind of T-PET), requiring people to select a team based on available information on two 
levels. This task should at least normatively be even more clearly responsive to an employee’s overall 
effect on his or her team, since it seems reasonable for a personnel manager to select those teams that 
performed best in the past (which should be easy to identify, cf. Experiment 2). In addition, we also 
increased the number of measurement blocks from one to four. This should further draw people’s focus 
to the global level. Finally, we introduced conditions varying the performance levels of the normal non-
altruistic workers to see whether participants can detect relatively small individual differences.  
Experiment 1b considers whether the same phenomena occur for egoist detection as for altruist 
detection, while again checking the sensitivity to smaller individual effects.  
Finally, Experiment 2 investigates whether and how quickly participants detect group-level effects 
of employees if the focus is on global information alone, with no conflicting information on individual 
payoffs. It checks whether people are cognitively able to discern quickly which worker has the highest 
overall group impact on group information alone. Additionally, we look at higher numbers of shifts. 
Experiment 1a – Altruist Detection in Personnel Selection as well as Personal Evaluation Tasks? 
Experiment 1 again used a personnel evaluation scenario, building on the large-impact-of-the-
altruist conditions from the above-mentioned preliminary study, again involving a single interactor 
only, for instance the ‘altruist,’ who was the lowest individual earner but overall contributed most to 
the success of the group. Experiment 1 addressed the following main issues:  
• Personnel selection. We used a personnel selection task, where the manager determined an 
optimal configuration of selected persons for a shift. This may focus participants more clearly 
on the overall earnings of a group. We aimed to explore our prediction whether or how far one 
can show the Tragedy-of-Personnel-Evaluation results in such a situation, or whether people 
may perhaps even begin to ignore the individual in favor of the group level. In the now shown 
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40 shifts we additionally measured the outcomes repeatedly (four times), thus also involving 
repeated selection tasks. Particularly if done repeatedly this may lead to an easier detection of 
the altruist’s highest overall contribution. 
• Sensitivity to distinguishing individual earnings. We varied the individual earnings of the ‘nor-
mal’ workers (whose presence did not interact with other workers’ performances) to allow 
checking whether participants tend to neglect individual differences. We used individual effects 
that were smaller than the overall group-utility of the altruist. Additionally, we used three kinds 
of individual differences between normal workers (non-interactors) to explore whether this had 
an effect. 
• Altruist detection versus egoist detection. Whereas Experiment 1a is concerned with positive 
interactors or altruist detection, Experiment 1b is concerned with egoist detection (see 
Experiment 1b for more details). 
• Selection of participants. We aimed to rule out effects of unmotivated participants from 
MTURK. Therefore we selected participants by attentiveness from the beginning.  
Design 
Table 1 shows the average earnings of normal workers and of the altruist in the four conditions (C1 to 
C4). In C1 we used the same payoff structure as in the conditions in the preliminary study that were 
characterized by a large impact of the altruist on the group’s performance. Here all normal (non-
interacting) workers did not differ in their individual average earnings. In C2 now, one individual 
normal worker (N1) stands out with a higher individual earning. In C3, both normal workers N1 and 
N2 differ from both N3 and N4, and in C4 all four normal workers differ from each other in average 
earnings.  
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Table 2. Mean earnings of normal workers (NW: N1 to N4), the altruist worker (A), the overall groups, 
with and without the altruist in the four conditions, and the resulting predictions if focused on workers’ 
individual or overall (including indirect) impact on the group earnings in Experiment 1a. 
   C1  C2 C3 C4 
Workers’ NW N1  2000€ 2300€ 2400€ 2600€ 
earnings without  N2 2000€ 1900€ 2400€ 2200€ 
atruist N3  2000€ 1900€ 1600€ 1800€ 
  N4  2000€ 1900€ 1600€ 1400€ 
 NW N1  3000€ 3300€ 3400€ 3600€ 
 with  N2  3000€ 2900€ 3400€ 3200€ 
 altruist N3  3000€ 2900€ 2600€ 2800€ 
  N4  3000€ 2900€ 2600€ 2400€ 
 altruist A 1600€ 1600€ 1600€ 1600€ 
Teams’ Without altruist  8000€ 8000€ 8000€ 8000€ 
earnings With altruist  10600€ 10600€ 10600€ 10600€ 
Predictions Individual  N1=N2=N
3=N4>A 
N1>N2=N
3=N4>A 
N1=N2>N
3=N4>A 
N1>N2>N
3>N4>A 
 Overall  A>N1=N2
=N3=N4 
A>N1>N2
=N3=N4 
A>N1=N2
>N3=N4 
A>N1>N2
>N3>N4 
In all conditions of Experiment 1a, we only have one positive interactor, the ‘altruist.’ The presence 
of the altruist modifies the outcome of the other workers’ mean earnings; and although individually the 
lowest contributor, he or she clearly affects most positively the overall earnings of the groups. This 
results in a dissociation of individual and group level earnings. Individually the altruist has the lowest, 
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whereas for the overall team the altruist has the most positive impact. Note also that the summed 
earnings of the four normal workers were kept constant over the conditions. 
Method 
Participants and selection criteria. Based on passing a participation-criterion (time spent on the 
first page > 20 sec. and < 6 min.), 156 people began the task.2 Subsequently, 140 people (90%) passed 
a further selection criterion –  correctly choosing (from four options) the task description: “You are 
instructed to evaluate the performance of the different employees for optimizing the companies’ overall 
earnings by analyzing data provided by the reporting unit.” Of these 140, 120 (86 %) finished the 
experiment. We worked solely with this selected pool of participants in order to ensure relatively 
motivated participants. Of the participants, 52% were male, 48% were female, the mean age was 33 
years, and 59% mentioned having a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree and 38% a high school degree as 
their highest level of education. The participants obtained a reward of $1. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four experimental conditions (cf. Table 2). 
Material and procedure. The materials were nearly identical and we used a similar procedure as 
the above-mentioned preliminary study (cf. Figure 1). We were again concerned with shifts of four 
workers out of potentially five. In each round, participants obtained information about the individual 
and overall payoffs of a shift. Additionally, we changed the payoff structure, to investigate how far 
participants distinguished relatively small individual differences and whether these latter might affect 
the detection of the larger impact of the altruist (cf. Table 2). Moreover, participants now obtained 
information on 40 working days, with each day displayed on a single page, and repeated test phases. 
                                                 
2 We do not know the rate of people not fulfilling the first criterion because the recorded numbers also included people who after 
initial information decided not to participate.  
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We now required participants to remain on each page for at least four seconds.  Only then could the 
‘continue’ button be pressed. Again, participants could stay on these pages as long as they wished. In 
this experiment the altruist was working 50% of the days. 
The workers now had to be evaluated by the participants (as managers) after Rounds 10, 20, 30 and 
40 (four test phases, repeated T-PET). In the first three test phases, we presented one evaluation task 
(the rating task) and the additional personnel selection task. In the rating task, participants rated each 
worker’s contribution on a scale of 1 to 10 (“Please rate contribution of the person shown above”). In 
the personnel selection task, participants were asked which four from the five employees they would 
select to work in a hypothetical further shift. Participants were told that all five employees would like 
to work and that their choice must optimize the profit for the company on that day. In the fourth test 
phase, we used all the evaluation measures from previous test phases (rating task and selection task) 
and some further tests in the order: the rating task, a maximal and minimal utility task, a ranking task, 
and the selection task. In the highest and lowest utility task[s? see above] the question read: “Which 
person has the greatest [or lowest] total utility for the company”. The ranking task was formulated: 
“Please rank the order of employees with regard to their total utility for the company in the present 
situation”.3 
Finally, we used (a) one item of a Kimchi-Palmer task (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982, similar to a Navon 
task; Navon, 1977), assessing global versus local perception preferences by asking whether nine (3 x 3) 
squares look more similar to nine (3 x 3) triangles (global similarity) or to 4 x 4 squares (local 
similarity). In addition we used (b) a miniature attention test;4 and (c) participants supplied 
                                                 
3 We will omit analyzing the ranking task, here and in the other experiments, since it seems redundant with the other measures. 
4 Under the heading ‘Height’ participants could choose an appropriate height from a drop-down list, but the text under the headlines 
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demographic data and comments on the task. The comments on what they had learned in the 
experiment (provided by almost all participants) were coded as ‘insightful’ if and only if participants 
mentioned any kind of group-level effects in contrast to only individual effects, or interactions of one 
(or more) employee(s) with at least one other employee (i.e., having any effect on others). Thus 
‘Insight’ was coded independently of whether the interactor mentioned was in fact doing the 
“interacting.”5   
Results 
Figure 2 presents the results of the rating task over the four test phases. The descriptive results are: 
(a) The average rating of the altruist in all conditions was lower than the ratings of the normal workers. 
Thus the average ratings even in the last phase seem quite clearly to reflect the individual contributions 
(individual impact) rather than the overall contributions of the workers (overall team impact). (b) The 
average ratings were sensitive to individual differences that were smaller than the overall impact of the 
altruist. (c) The ratings for the altruist in all conditions and phases were actually lowest from the first 
test phase onward. Thus the ratings appear quite stable over time.  
                                                                                                                                                                       
instructed them to use the ‘not-specified’ option as a test. We do not consider it irrational to overlook such a text, given the context. 
Nonetheless, this easily assessed item could serve as a simple indicator of participants’ attentiveness or tendency to process information in 
a detailed, “bottom-up” way.  
5 First one experimenter coded each comment; then another one checked this. Differences were resolved accordingly. 
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Figure 2. Average ratings (with SE) in Experiment 1a for the four normal workers (N) and altruist 
workers (A) in the test phases P1 to P4 of Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Panels A to D). 
 
Correspondingly, inferential statistics, using a global analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Phases 
and Workers as within-subject factor and Conditions as between-subject factor, show reliable effects of 
Workers (PST: due to violations of sphericity we again used Pillai-Spur Tests, PST, F(4, 112) = 
121.19, p < .001), Workers × Conditions (PST, F(12, 342) = 27.69, p < .001), but also of Phases (PST, 
F(3, 113) = 6.01, p = .009). Phases × Workers only approached significance (PST, F(12, 104) = 1.67, p 
= .08).  
Even in the empirically most critical condition (C4), the mean ratings in Phase 4 are obviously at 
odds with the overall-level prediction based on the worker’s overall contribution (A > N1 > N2 > N3 > 
N4; cf. Table 2). As speculated, contrasts show significant results for all five predicted mean differen-
ces, based on individual contributions (N1 > N2 > N3 > N4 > A): N1 > N2: F(1, 28) = 5.47; p < .027; 
N2 > N3: F(1, 28) = 39.8; p < .001;  N3 > N4: F(1, 28) = 34.49; p < .001; N4 > A: F(1, 28) = 37.96; p 
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< 001.  
 
Figure 3. Results of the personnel selection task in the four test phases of Experiment 1a, depicting the 
proportion of ‘managers’ choosing a team of four from five candidates, thus excluding either worker 
N1, N2, N3, N4, or the altruist worker A. Optimal individual-related selections are black, optimal 
team-related selections are medium gray, and other selections are light gray. 
 
The results of the personnel-selection task are shown in Figure 3. We used different levels of gray to 
mark individually optimal exclusions of the altruist (black), overall optimal team-related selections 
(medium gray), and other selections (light gray). The personnel-selection task could have yielded better 
results, since the selection task by definition seems to focus on the group level and explicitly 
emphasized overall earnings. Participants performing repeated selection tasks could thus realize the 
consistently and clearly lower outcome of teams without the altruist, relative to the only other four 
team-configurations. But Figure 3 shows that, even in this task, participants tended to exclude the 
altruist as the overall best worker of the team and to choose the candidate with the only individually 
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optimal performance (black instead of medium gray selections). Again this was quite stable over time. 
Even in the final Round 4, the altruist was excluded clearly and highly reliably more often than all 
other workers put together, χ2(1, N = 120) = 32.03, p < .001). This was also the case for all single 
conditions, even the most critical C4 (χ2(1, N = 29) = 5.83, p = .016). Among those who did choose the 
altruist for the team, one can distinguish (at least in C2 to C4) those who additionally chose 
individually optimal normal workers (medium gray), or not (light gray); and in this subgroup the 
individually optimal normal workers were overall selected significantly more often, χ2(1, N = 24) = 
4.17, p = .041).  
 
Figure 4. Percentage of ‘managers’ choosing either a normal worker (N) or the altruist worker (A) as 
being of highest (Panel A) or lowest (Panel B) utility for the company (Conditions C1, C2, C3, C4). 
The choices based directly on individual earnings are marked in black, those based on the overall 
earnings in medium gray, and the others in light gray. 
 
Figure 4 presents the proportions of workers selected to be of highest or lowest ‘total utility’ for the 
company in the final test phase (highest/lowest utility task). Here again, in all conditions a clear 
majority did not assign the highest utility based on the overall impact of the earnings of the group 
(medium gray), but instead favour the individual earnings (black) reliably over all others (C4: χ2(1, N = 
120) = 161.22, p < .001). In all conditions, the majority of participants ascribed the lowest utility to the 
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‘altruist’ (Figure 4B). This was the case even in the empirically least clear condition (C4), where the 
black choices were still significantly more frequent than all other choices taken together, χ2(1, N = 29) 
=  12.45, p < .001.  
With regard to the few selections that were not individually optimal, conditions C2 to C4 addi-
tionally allowed for testing whether the overall-optimal altruist selections in the highest utility task 
occurred at least with a higher relative frequency than the selections of other normal workers (exact 
binomial test, N = 10, p = .011). Additionally, the lowest utility task in C2 to C4 shows that among 
those who did not ascribe the lowest utility to the altruist, participants were sensitive in distinguishing 
individual earnings of normal workers. The lowest-utility assignments were more frequent for normal 
workers with lowest individual earnings (medium gray) than for normal workers with higher individual 
earnings (light gray) (χ2(1, N = 15) =  8.97, p = .005).  
Participants’ comments quite clearly show that at least some grasped the high (or highest) utility of 
the altruist. In Experiment 2, ten comments by participants (8%) were coded as explicitly mentioning 
interactions between workers’ performances or differences between workers’ individual and overall 
performances. Several describe this discovery as a personal insight. Example 1: “What I learned is that 
I should look beyond my initial impression and study the data carefully. My first impression was that 
the female with the glasses was not contributing to the earnings of the company.  However, after 
further analysis I realized that the highest earning days were when she was working. This led me to 
conclude that even though her sales might not be as much as the others, she was contributing in ways 
that increased the sales of the other employees.” Example 2: “At first, I was so focused on the 
employees' individual earnings that I viewed it as more of an indicator of who brought the most to the 
business...  but then I started noticing a pattern: every time the man in the suit with checkered shirt was 
missing, total earnings plummeted. His individual earnings was the lowest, but the other workers 
always earned more when he was there than when he wasn't (causing total earnings to exceed other 
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days). It was almost as if he added to their morale, or had a personality that bettered the working 
environment (i.e., encouraging, etc.). That is why I chose him as the highest utility, despite his low(er) 
individual earnings.” Example 3: “Well, I learned that it wasn't all about individual profits but 
sometimes something deeper. I realized that a certain individual in the group made the others work 
better when grouped with them. While this individual didn't earn much by himself, together with the 
others his group earned the most profit. So I think sometimes you have to look past the surface and 
delve deeper if you want to truly understand some things.” Overall, of the ten participants with 
insightful comments, all (100%) selected the altruist to be on the team in the personnel selection task in 
Phase 4 (cf. Figure 4), whereas of the participants without insightful comments, only 17% made this 
team selection (rφ = .53; exact Fisher test, p < .001). Ninety percent of participants with insightful 
comments had already made this selection in Round 3 (rφ = .53, p < .001), and 80 % in Round 2 (rφ = 
.51, p < .001), but only 30% in Round 1 (rφ = .09, p = .388). Additionally, insightful comments 
correlated with rating the altruist higher than at least one normal worker (Round 4, exact Fisher tests, 
rφ = .48, p < .001; Round 3, rφ = .26, p < .001; Round 2, rφ = .19, p = .077; Round 1, rφ = .03, p = .658), 
and with a higher rating than all normal workers (Round 4, rφ = .53, p < .001; Round 3, rφ = .54, p < 
.001; Round 2, rφ = .43, p = .006; Round 1, rφ = .24, p = .054). 
With regard to the additional tests, in the Kimchi-Palmer task global answers (overall 30%) did not 
significantly correlate with insightful comments (rφ  = –.09, p = .722). As to the attention task (with 
72% correct answers), all participants with ‘insightful’ comments correctly solved this (100%), 
whereas only 70% of the other participants did. If tested two-tailed, this correlation only approximated 
being significant (rφ  = .19, p = .060).  
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Discussion 
Experiment 1a corroborates the idea that there may be a potential “tragedy of personnel evaluation.” 
First, in Experiment 1a participants seem mostly to ignore the extremely positive effect of the altruist 
on a shift’s overall performance even in the fourth test phase. The utility ratings seemed mostly to 
reflect the workers’ individual but not overall performance. This holds for the numerical rating tasks as 
well as for the highest and lowest overall tasks. One might object that the question of the rating tasks 
was formulated relatively openly; it was not explicitly stated whether one should base judgments on the 
direct individual utility contribution rather than on the overall contribution. Nonetheless, it remains 
significant that participants’ judgments tended to be based on individual utility alone. Moreover, we 
obtained similar results for the highest and lowest utility task as well, where participants were explicitly 
concerned with the workers’ “total utility for your business.” This strongly suggests that most people 
did not realise the great overall group effect of the altruist. 
Second, in the repeated personnel selection tasks participants should assemble teams that are most 
profitable for their company. From their very nature, these team selection tasks focus on overall team 
performance. Note that the task is quite simple since there were only five configurations (cf. also 
Experiment 2). Nonetheless, most participants excluded the best team player (the altruist), even though 
the shifts without the altruist were clearly much less profitable. 
Third, despite the lack of sensitivity regarding the overall utility of workers, the results show that 
people were actually quite sensitive to relatively small differences at the individual level.  
Finally, there was a subgroup of participants whose comments revealed insight into the two 
dissociated levels of earnings (individual and group levels); and it was shown that this significantly 
correlated with selecting the altruist for the team and, to perhaps a slightly lesser degree, with 
evaluating the altruist more positively in the ratings tasks.  
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Overall, the results corroborate that participants in the role of personnel managers may 
systematically tend to evaluate the altruist with highest overall utility to be of lowest utility. 
Additionally, they mostly excluded this ‘altruist’ from the team.  
Experiment 1b – Does ‘Egoist’ Detection in Personnel Evaluation Lead to Similar Results? 
Whereas Experiment 1a investigated the evaluation of a positively interacting worker, Experiment 
1b now concerns the analogous case of a negatively interacting worker, called the ‘egoist’.  It is well 
known in organisational psychology that negative members can disproportionally affect the 
productivity of a whole team, for instance by spawning dysfunctional group processes (Felps, Mitchell, 
& Byington, 2006). Again the ‘egoist’ is only behaviourally defined as consistently having the highest 
individual earnings in the team while affecting the overall team performance most negatively.  
Otherwise, Experiment 1b is almost identical to Experiment 1a. In this study, participants were 
again acting as personnel managers, repeatedly making personnel evaluations and selections 
concerning employees of a snack bar (working in teams of four out of five potential workers). 
Experiment 1b explores whether the tragedy of personnel evaluation is unique to altruist detection, or 
whether an analogous phenomenon exhibits itself for egoist detection as well.  
From the viewpoint of a related debate on deontic rule testing, this might be doubted, since it has 
been claimed that people detect cheaters, but not altruists or co-operators (Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer 
& Hug, 1992). However, this strand of research, mainly concerned with Wason’s selection task (WST), 
has arguably mainly highlighted the differences between the domains of deontic rules and descriptive 
hypotheses (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Fodor, 2000; Beller, 2010; von Sydow, 2006), with deontic 
reasoning reflecting a fairly systematic deontic faculty (Beller, 2010; Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 
2005; von Sydow, 2006), despite potential sub-classes within the deontic domain (Fiddick, Cosmides, 
& Tooby, 2000). Moreover, the putative faculty for cheater-detection may depend upon specific goals 
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(von Sydow, 2006; von Sydow & Hagmayer, 2006; cf. Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 
2009; Sperber & Girotto, 2002), and perhaps the WST paradigm is too restrictive to investigate these 
phenomena (Sperber & Girotto, 2002). The WST question does not settle the more general question of 
how readily people deal with dissociations of individual-level and group-level performance or how 
they manage to detect pro-social or altruistic behaviour in general. Research in repeated public-good 
games suggests that the option of mutual reward may be as effective as (or even more so than) mutual 
punishment to increase payoffs (Kiyonari & Barclay, 2008; Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & 
Nowak, 2009). However, the T-PETs investigated here address a different issue, investigating whether 
a third-party player can detect the dissociated individual and team effects of an ‘egoistic’ player. Do 
people ignore the group effects of the egoistic interactor as they did for the altruistic interactor? Or, 
inversely do they perhaps ignore the individual-level information? Despite differences to the WST-
debate, such findings may shed light on more general issues raised in that debate. 
Design 
Table 3 shows the average earnings of the negative interactor, the egoist (E), and, depending on the 
latter’s presence or absence, the average earnings of the normal workers in the four conditions. The 
conditions, as in Experiment 1a, vary the homogeneous and heterogeneous earnings for the normal 
workers (C1 most homogeneous; C4 most heterogeneous) to investigate participants’ sensitivity to 
small differences on the individual level – much smaller than the egoist’s overall effect on the team’s 
performance. In all conditions the presence of the individually most successful egoist leads to a 
substantial decline in the team’s overall performance.  
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Table 3 
Mean earnings of normal workers (NW: N1 to N4) and of the negatively interacting ‘egoist’ worker 
(E), as well as the overall earnings with or without the egoist in the four conditions; and resulting 
predictions if based on a worker’s individual or the overall performance in Experiment 1b. 
   C1  C2 C3 C4 
Workers’ NW N1  3000€ 3300€ 3400€ 3600€ 
earnings without  N2 3000€ 2900€ 3400€ 3200€ 
egoist N3  3000€ 2900€ 2600€ 2800€ 
  N4  3000€ 2900€ 2600€ 2400€ 
 NW N1  2000€ 2300€ 2400€ 2600€ 
 with  N2  2000€ 1900€ 2400€ 2200€ 
 egoist N3  2000€ 1900€ 1600€ 1800€ 
  N4  2000€ 1900€ 1600€ 1400€ 
 Egoist E 3400€ 3400€ 3400€ 3400€ 
Teams’ Without 
egoist 
 12000€ 12000€ 12000€ 12000€ 
earnings With egoist  9400€ 9400€ 9400€ 9400€ 
Predictions Individual  E>N1=N2
=N3=N4 
E>N1>N2
=N3=N4 
E>N1=N2
>N3=N4 
E>N1>N2
>N3>N4 
 Overall  N1=N2=N
3=N4>E 
N1>N2=N
3=N4>E 
N1=N2>N
3=N4>E 
N1>N2>N
3>N4>E 
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To keep most of the payoff structure in Table 3 similar to Experiment 1a (cf. Table 2), we simply 
exchanged the earnings of the normal workers in the with-interactor context with those in the without-
interactor context. Thus again, the overall earnings of all workers together remained constant over 
conditions. Moreover, the egoist’s individual earnings in C1 increased (relative to an average normal 
worker without egoist) as much as the altruist’s individual earnings had decreased (relative to a normal 
worker without altruist). Thus the predictions of Experiment 1b are reversed (relative to Experiment 
1a): If the judgments are based on individual performance alone, it is now expected that the interactor – 
here the egoist – should be rated highest (not lowest, as with the altruist); and if they are based on 
overall impact, the egoist should now obtain the lowest ratings (rather than the highest ratings, as with 
the altruist). 
Method 
Participants. The first participation-criterion (again the time spent on the first page > 20 sec. and < 
6 min.) yielded 161 participants from MTURK. Without advanced notice, participants were then 
required to rephrase the described task; 151 people passed this second test. Of these, 128 (85 %) 
finished the experiment. Additionally we excluded the data of eight participants who had previously 
taken part in a similar experiment. Thus, as in Experiment 1a, we analyzed data of 120 participants 
(52% male, 48% female; mean age 33), most of them with a high school or even an academic degree 
(59% Bachelor’s or Master’s; 38% high school). The participants obtained rewards of $1 for 
participation. They were randomly assigned to one of four conditions (cf. Table 2). 
Material and procedure. Apart from the payoff structure (Tables 2 and 3), the scenario, procedure, 
and dependent variables used in Experiment 1b were identical to Experiment 1a (excluding minor 
corrections of typographical errors). In each round, participants obtained overview information in 
tables about workers’ individual earnings, together with their photographs and information about 
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overall earnings of the team (Figure 1). Again there were only five workers, with four workers per shift 
and five possible team configurations. The first three test phases included only rating tasks and a team 
selection task; the final round additionally involved the maximal and minimal utility task and further 
tests mentioned in the methods section of Experiment 1a.   
Results  
 
Figure 5. Average ratings (with SE) in Experiment 1b for the four normal workers (N) and egoist 
worker (E) in the test phases P1 to P4 of Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Panels A to D) 
 
Figure 5 shows the average utility ratings for all snack bar workers in the four conditions. In all 
conditions the average ratings resemble more closely the predictions based on individual rather than 
overall team-contributions (cf. Table 3). A global mixed ANOVA with the between-subjects factor 
Conditions and the within-subjects factors Workers and Phases (in a multivariate Pillai-Spur Test, PST) 
showed significant effects of Workers, F(4, 110)=95.86, p < .001, Workers × Conditions, F(12, 
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336)=21.94, p < .001, and Phases, F(3, 111) = 3.41, p = .020. The effects of Phase × Person, F(12, 102) 
=1.78, p = .061, did not reach significance.  
To obtain more specific insights we analyzed each condition. In Condition 1, a repeated-measure-
ment ANOVA, with Workers and Phases as factors, shows effects of Workers, PST, F(4, 26) = 4.19, p 
= .001, with the egoist on average having higher ratings than the other four workers throughout all 
phases. Did the repeated measurement factor Phase (i.e., change over time) play a role? Despite a 
descriptive decline in the difference between the egoist and the normal workers throughout the test 
phases, the factor Phase and the interaction Workers × Phase only approached significance (p = .08, p = 
.12). In Condition 2, there was again only a reliable effect of Workers, PST, F(4, 24) = 25.20, p < .001, 
with no other statistically fully significant effect of Phase or Workers × Phase (p = .73, p = .07). 
Although the average rating of the egoist was descriptively higher than the average rating of all other 
workers, the egoist had similar ratings to the normal worker predicted to be highest.  Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc comparisons showed no differences between the egoist and normal worker 1 (E, N1) 
(p = 1.00); but N1, as predicted, also had a higher rating than the other normal workers, which also was 
the case for the egoist (all comparisons, p < .001). In Condition 3, the factor Workers was also 
significant (PST, F(4, 22) = 24.10, p < .001), but no other factors were (p = .79, p = .59). Bonferroni-
corrected post hoc comparisons showed that the egoist was not rated higher than the predicted 
individually good normal workers (N1, N2) (both p = 1.00), but rather that the worker in this group, as 
well as the egoist, clearly and reliably differed from those in the second group of normal workers (N3, 
N4; all p < .001). Condition 4 likewise shows only a significant effect of Worker (PST, F(4, 28) = 
58.61, p < .001), but no other significant effect (p = .171, p = .845). Bonferroni comparisons here 
showed significant effects of all five workers in the order predicted by individual earnings only (all p < 
.01).  
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Overall, the main pattern of ratings-task results largely corresponds with the order predicted by 
individual earnings. It is clearly at odds with the order that would follow from the overall impact of 
workers on the group level (cf. Table 3). Although the ratings for the egoist were often higher than 
those of the normal workers (and never significantly lower than any of them), the difference at least 
regarding the most efficient normal worker (or group of normal workers) was not always large or 
statistically significant. This seems to suggest a somewhat increased (but not high) influence of group-
level predictions.  
 
 
Figure 6. Results of the personnel selection task in the four test phases of Experiment 1b, showing 
the proportion of ‘managers’ choosing a team of four out of five, thus excluding worker N1, N2, N3, 
N4, or the egoist worker E. Individual-related optimal selections are marked in black, with team-related 
optimal selections in medium gray and other selections in light gray. 
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In the repeated personnel selection tasks the main question is whether the ‘managers’ included the 
egoist on the team (who consistently had the lowest team earnings). The results, shown in Figure 6, 
show that the majority selected teams with optimal earnings on the individual level (black; individual-
related selections). Only a few selected the team configuration without the egoist (from five possible 
team configurations), although this team had clearly and consistently the best overall performance 
(medium gray; team-related selections). The remaining selections (light gray) selected the egoist for the 
team, along with other, individually non-optimal workers.  
Even in the final test phase, Phase 4, the individual-related selections (black) in all conditions 
together occurred more frequently than the team-related ones (medium gray), χ2(1, N =118) = 34.71, p 
< .001. In contrast to Experiment 1a, in C1 to C3 this might be due to the higher number of classes of 
individual-related rather than team-related classes. However, the black selections still occur more 
frequently than all other selections (both with an equal number of classes), χ2(1, N = 120) = 32.03, p < 
.001. Even in Condition 4, where the black and medium-gray selections are represented by one class 
only, the individual-related selections (black) have a higher relative frequency than all other selections 
together (Round 4, χ2(1, N = 32) = 18.00, p < .001).  With regard to temporal changes, there seems to 
be an increase in the proportion of team-related selections medium gray) from Phase 1 (9%) to Phase 4 
(23%); χ2(1, N = 240) = 8.00, p = .005. Additionally, in Phase 4 (in C2 to C4) the optimal team-related 
selections (medium gray) without egoist occur more often (relative to the number of categories) than 
the non-optimal selections with egoist (light gray), χ2(1, N = 18) = 25.00, p < .001, corroborating that 
these ‘deviations’ from the individual-related selections are not merely chance. Finally, clear 
differences between conditions likewise show participants’ sensitivity to even relatively small 
individual differences.  
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Figure 7. Percentage of ‘managers’ choosing either a normal worker (N) or the egoist worker (E) as 
of the highest (Panel A) or lowest (Panel B) utility for the company (Conditions C1, C2, C3, C4) in 
Experiment 1b. The individual-related choices are marked in black, the team-related choices in medium 
gray and the neither-individual-nor-team-related choice in light gray. 
 
Figure 7 shows which workers in the final phase (Phase 4) were judged to have the highest or lowest 
‘total utility’ for the company. The highest-utility task (Panel A) reveals relatively frequent ‘egoist’-
judgments (black), even though the egoist’s presence was consistently correlated with lowest team 
earnings. In all conditions these judgments were clearly above chance level (χ2(1, N = 31) = 63.88, p < 
.001; χ2(1, N = 30) =46.8, p < .001; χ2(1, N = 27) = 21.33, p < .001; χ2(1, N = 32) = 47.53, p < .001). 
Looking at the team-related judgments (medium gray), they are also above chance level relative to the 
remaining judgments (neither optimal on group or individual level; light gray), χ2(1, N = 31) =50.58, p 
< .001 (C2 to C4).  
In the lowest-utility task (Figure 7, Panel B), the individual-related selections (black) were chosen 
more often than chance-level, χ2(1, N = 120) =175.21, p < .001. In the three conditions (C2 to C4), 
where one can contrast the team-related judgments (egoist has overall the lowest utility; medium gray) 
with judgments that were neither individually nor on group-level optimal (light gray), the team-related 
judgments occurred reliably more often (exact binomial test, N = 13, p < .001). 
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With regard to the comments, now 21% of the participants mentioned explicitly that the individual- 
and group-level contributions of a worker differ, or that there are interactions between participants. 
Example 1: “I learned that while the woman in the striped shirt outperformed everyone individually, on 
the days she worked the overall profit went down. Because of this, she proved to actually be the least 
valuable member of the team, despite being the strongest individual. The best group to work in the 
shop would be the four employees other than the woman in the striped shirt.” Example 2: “It seemed to 
me that the brown haired guy was bringing down the productivity of the two female workers, the one 
with glasses and the one with the striped shirt.” Example 3: “Interesting to me that one person can 
dramatically outperform her peers but at the same time seemingly be the reason why the store's 
earnings are 75% of the earnings in which she isn't working.”  
Eighty percent of the participants with such insightful comments in Phase 4 excluded the egoist in 
the personnel selection task from the team, whereas only 7% of the other participants did so (rφ = .76, p 
< .001). This strongly suggests that the detection of interaction has a substantial effect on the selection 
task. Additionally, in earlier phases there were substantial and statistically reliable correlations of 
insightful comments with team-related selections: Phase 3, rφ = .70, p < .001; Phase 2, rφ = .64, p < 
.001; Phase 1, rφ = .26, p < .003 (where some selections may have been due to chance). This suggests a 
high stability from Phase 2 onward. Furthermore, insightful comments correlated positively but again a 
bit weaker with ratings, coding positively for at least one normal worker rated above the egoist (Phase 
4, rφ = .45, p < .001; Phase 3, rφ = .30, p = .002; Phase 2, rφ = .25, p = .007; Phase 1, rφ = –.08, p = 
.429) or for all normal workers rated higher than the egoist (Phase 4, rφ = .58, p < .001; Phase 3, rφ = 
.55, p < .001; Phase 2, rφ = .31, p = .003; Phase 1, rφ = .09, p = .377).  
The additional tests did not reliably correlate with insightful comments. In the Kimshi-Palmer test, 
global answers (overall 31%) did not correlate with insightful comments (rφ  = –.08, p = .471); and in 
the attention task (with 52% correct answers) the positive correlation with insightful comments did not 
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approach significance (rφ  = -.10, p = .377). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1b show that egoist detection seems to be affected by similar problems as 
altruist detection. When the negative interactor (or ‘egoist’ for short) individually contributed the 
highest earnings but overall led to the lowest group earnings, the majority of participants nonetheless 
rated the egoist as most valuable. Moreover, in the personnel selection task they even systematically 
chose him for the team, even though this team consistently performed the worst. This was the case even 
though participants were quite aware of small differences at the individual level. Thus the results 
suggest a corresponding tragedy of personnel selection with regard to ‘egoists’, or negative interactors, 
despite the fact that participants only had to identify one global interactor. The phenomenon seems to 
affect both positive and negative interactions.  
In comparison to Experiment 1a, Experiment 1b, despite its negative results, suggests a moderate 
advantage of egoist detection over altruist detection. In particular, the results of the rating tasks seem to 
be less dominated by individual-level judgments for egoist detection than for altruist detection.6 
Furthermore, there were significantly more insightful comments in Experiment 1b (egoist detection) 
than in Experiment 1a (altruist detection), χ2(1, N = 240) =  7.53, p = .006. This suggests that the 
content of egoist versus altruist detection leads to different interaction detection rates.  
Although the direction of this effect is indeed in line with the idea of an advantage of egoist or 
                                                 
6 Also the results of the highest utility task suggest that more people in Experiment 1b did not select the negative interactor (the 
egoist) to be of highest utility than selected the positive interactor (the altruist) in Experiment 1a; thus there seems an apparent increase of 
team-related judgments in the highest utility task. However, the basis of this comparison may be unfair, since for the highest utility task 
there were more group-related categories in Experiment 1b than in Experiment 1a. 
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cheater detection over altruist detection (cf. Cosmides, 1989; Gigerenzer & Hug, 1992), the small size 
of the effect supports the idea that there is in principle no (substantial) difference between these 
faculties (Oaksford & Chater, 1994; von Sydow, 2006; Beller, 2010; Bucciarelli & Johnson-Laird, 
2005; Sperber & Girotto, 2002). In any case, the results prompt the question of why people in our 
setting have problems detecting both kinds of interactors despite the relatively strong group effects.. 
Nonetheless, the insightful comments made clear that at least a relevant minority was able to detect 
the difference between a worker’s individual versus overall contributions to a group. This was 
associated with group-related answers in the personal evaluation and the personnel selection tasks, to 
some extent even in early test phases. 
Experiment 2 – Optimal Evaluations and Selections Without Conflicting Information?  
Experiment 2 aims to test a possible explanation for the tragedy of personnel evaluation observed in the 
preliminary study and Experiments 1a and 1b. One possibility is that (most) people are simply unable 
to detect group-level correlations given the shown number of days (the correlation between a worker’s 
presence and the overall outcome at a group level).  Alternatively, they may at least in principle be able 
to do so if forced to concentrate on this correlation only, without being distracted by (inconsistent) 
individual-level information.  To test this we ran a version without individual-level information.  
Perhaps memorising and integrating information over time is too difficult even if the correlation is very 
high (r = .99, cf. preliminary study and Experiment 1) and though we found in Experiments 1a and 1b 
that participants were very well able to detect much smaller differences on the individual level. The 
resulting finding would in any case remain tragic, particularly since we worked with a relatively simple 
setting (only five workers). The other possibility would be that people are in principle able to see the 
correlation between an individual’s presence and team performance over time, while for some reason 
fail to pay attention to the group level, focusing instead (almost) solely on the (conflicting) individual 
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impacts. The evidence that up to one-fifth of the participants understood the two-level task is 
inconclusive on this point; it may either show that only these participants had an ability to see group-
level effects in the given time (several group-level findings were above chance) or that they alone 
considered the group-level question.  
After having considered the possibility of content effects of altruist vs. egoist detection, Experiment 
2 elaborates on the issue of focusing people on the group level. We kept the initial story and again used 
personnel evaluation and selection tasks, here with altruist detection, in a sequential learning setting 
(T-PET, Experiment 1a). However, to test the the explanatory hypotheses, we investigated whether 
people were able to detect the group-level correlation if forced to focus on this level. Additionally, we 
again increased the number of rounds in conditions focusing on the group level as well as in other 
conditions.  
Experiment 2 thus differs from Experiment 1 in the following two important aspects: 
• Global-information-only condition: In these new conditions, participants obtained overall 
group-earnings, without the direct individual contributions of each worker. If people were 
simply incapable of learning the correlations between individual presence and group-level 
earnings, the effects should completely persist, whereas they should completely disappear if 
people are able to detect these correlations and in the local-and-global-condition do not focus on 
these conditions. For the global-only condition we at least expected that people would 
somewhat more often pick the altruist, since they are forced to concentrate on an individual’s 
overall (i.e., group-level) effects, with no supplementary individual analysis. We aimed to 
explore whether this was the case, and whether most participants could discern the overall best 
worker under such conditions. If so, we wanted to see how many rounds were required.  
• Prolonged learning: We increased the number of rounds (now 80 rounds with overview 
information, each round with no time limit). Even though the results of the previous 
Ignorance of Group-Level Effects   38 
 
experiments suggest a slow increase of altruist detection, we looked for a point after which 
altruist detection increased dramatically. That is, in the only-global-information conditions 
more rounds may be needed to recognize which worker has the overall best outcome.  
Design 
The experiment had a mixed 2 (information: global-only vs. local-and-global) × 2 (earnings of 
normal workers: homogeneous versus heterogeneous) between-subjects design, with an additional 
within-subjects factor of four test phases. In each test phase both evaluation and personnel-selection 
tasks were applied. Additionally, in the last round, highest and lowest utility tasks and other tests were 
completed (as in Experiments 1a and 1b). We added a need-for-cognition (NFC) test, to explore the 
prediction that participants who detect the two levels of analysis (individual and overall impact) engage 
in cognitive activities with higher elaboration.  
 
Table 4 
Overview of the four conditions, also showing the overall vs. direct impact of a worker on the earnings 
of a group in Experiment 2 (for the detailed earnings cf. Experiment 1a, Table 2, C1 and C4). 
Condition C1 C2 C3 C4 
Information Local and global Global only Local and global Global only 
Earnings of NW Homogeneous, cf. Table 2, C1 Heterogeneous, cf. Table 2, C4 
   Overall impact A >> NW1 = NW2 = NW3 = NW4 A >> NW1 > NW2 > NW3 > NW4 
   Direct impact NW1 = NW2 = NW3 = NW4 > A NW1 > NW2 > NW3 > NW4 > A 
Note: NW = normal worker; A = altruist.  
 
Table 4 illustrates four conditions. The local-and-global conditions use the same overview 
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information as in each round of the previous experiments (Figure 1). Each round presents information 
on both the direct earnings of the four workers on a shift and the overall earnings of a given team. The 
overall earnings of course involve not only the direct earnings of individuals but also the overall 
earnings. In the global-only conditions, only the overall earnings of a group (shift) are presented, 
without showing individual contributions.  
The homogeneous versus the heterogeneous conditions correspond to either identical or different 
individual impact of all workers (using the numbers of C1 and C4 of Experiment 1a; see Table 2). As 
before, the ‘altruist’ (A) in both conditions has the most positive impact on the overall earnings 
although individually the lowest direct impact. The impact of the normal workers (NW) does not differ 
in the homogeneous conditions but did differ in the heterogeneous condition (while keeping their mean 
contribution identical; Table 2). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four resultant 
conditions. 
Method 
Participants. The same relatively strict selection criteria for participants were used as in 
Experiments 1a and 1b to ensure high data quality. The first participation criterion (time spent on the 
first page) was passed by 150 people. For the second criterion, 7 people failed (correct rephrasing of 
the task from four options). Of the remaining 143, 122 finished the experiment, and we again worked 
with those who finished the main task. The participants were recruited from MTURK: 57% male, 42% 
female; mean age 33, and 68% with a Bachelor’s or Master’s degree (32% had a high school degree). 
Participants obtained a reward of $2 for participating.  
Material and procedure. We used almost identical materials to and a similar procedure as in 
Experiment 1a. The experiment had 80 rounds rather than 40, with four test phases administered after 
Rounds 20, 40, 60, and 80. In all four test phases again, both a personnel evaluation task and a 
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personnel selection task were assessed. In the final test phase, we again administered an additional 
highest- and lowest-utility task, a ranking task, and kept the Kimchi-Palmer test-item, and the attention 
test. Finally, we added an 18-item version of the Need for Cognition Test (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 
1984).7  
In the global-and-local conditions, the overview information tables presented in each round 
correspond to Figure 1. In the global-only conditions, the second line of this panel, presenting the 
individual earnings of each employee, was omitted in order to assess the potential of people to see 
overall differences if forced to concentrate on the overall (global) information. Thus participants in 
these conditions for each of the 80 days saw only pictures of the four workers (out of five) on the shift 
as well as their overall team-output. Again, only five team combinations were possible. 
Results 
Figure 8 shows mean ratings for the workers’ contributions to the company earnings. An overall 
ANOVA with Workers (five workers) and Phases (four phases) as within-subjects factors, and 
Conditions as between-subject factor, yielded a highly significant effect of Conditions × Workers 
(Pillai-Spur Test, PST, F(12, 306) = 22.52, p < .001). A main reason for this expected interaction effect 
seems to be the change of rank in the altruist’s ratings in the global-only versus global-and-local 
conditions. Furthermore, the Workers factor became significant (PST, F(4, 100) = 17.34, p < .001).8 
                                                 
7 Each item was assessed on a symmetric five-level scale of agreement, with “extremely” (–2, 2) or “somewhat (–1, 1) 
uncharacteristic /characteristic of me,” and “uncertain” (0) as labels. The scores of the items (–2, –1, 0, 1, 2) were summed up to calculate 
the overall test score.  
8 This may reflect that for all conditions (despite their considerable variation) the altruist was at least on average rated lower than 
some other workers (e.g., N1).  
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Phase × Condition as well as Phase × Workers approached significance-level (PST, F(9, 309) = 1.69, p 
= .09; PST, F(12, 92) = 1.51, p = .133), and potential changes over the Phases were not substantial.  
 
Figure 8. Average ratings (with SE) in Experiment 2 for the four normal (N) and altruist (A) workers in 
test phases P1 to P4 of Conditions 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Panels A to D). 
 
The local-and-global conditions, both in the homogeneous Condition 1 and the heterogeneous 
Condition 3 (Panels A and C), broadly seem to replicate findings of Experiment 2 (Conditions 1 and 4), 
even with double the number of learning rounds. The altruist is still evaluated as lowest, even though 
most strongly correlated with high overall earnings. In the homogeneous Condition 1, the four normal 
workers were evaluated similarly, with each higher than the altruist. In an ANOVA for test phase 4, the 
within-subject factor Workers was clearly significant (PST, F(4, 23) = 10.19, p < .001), descriptively 
mainly referring to the lower rating of the altruist. Furthermore, individual contrasts with normal 
workers confirmed that all normal workers were rated higher than the altruist (all p < .05). Another 
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ANOVA showed that no significant differences between the normal workers remained when the 
altruist was removed (PST = .12, F(3, 25) = 1.16, p = .344). In the heterogeneous Condition 3, an 
ANOVA likewise showed a general effect of Workers (PST, F(4, 24) = 38.87, p < .001), but also, as 
expected, the four normal workers were rated differently, with significant contrasts in the predicted 
order N1 > N2 > N3 > N4 > A (each contrast, p < .001). Again, the ratings did not significantly change 
over time.  
In the new global-only conditions (homogeneous Condition 2 and heterogeneous Condition 4), in 
which people were to base their ratings of a worker’s utility on the teams’ overall earnings alone, they 
clearly detected that, of all workers, the altruist correlated most demonstrably with high overall 
earnings. Although we had speculated that participants might grasp this later on, they in fact did so 
surprisingly early (even before the first test phase after round 20, corresponding to the insignificant 
results of the factor Phase in the omnibus ANOVA). The results, however, also suggest a negative 
effect of the exclusive focus on the overall contributions, since in the heterogeneous global-only 
condition (C4) participants were less able (than in C3) to distinguish (smaller) individual differences.  
In more detail, comparing the homogeneous conditions C2 to C1, the pattern of ratings is reversed and 
the results in Condition 2 are now at least roughly in line with the hypothesis: People induce that the 
altruist contributes more to the good of the company than the normal workers: A > NW1 = NW2 =  
NW3 = NW4. An ANOVA for Condition 2 (test phase 4) shows significant results for the factor 
Workers (PST, F(4, 22) = 23.04, p < .001); and pair-wise contrasts show that here the altruist is rated 
higher than all normal workers (always with p <.001). Although these were the largest effects (Figure 
10), an ANOVA without the altruist also showed remaining differences between the normal workers 
(PST, F(3, 24) = 5.37, p = .006) (which clearly seems due to chance, since all normal workers had 
roughly the same earnings). In the heterogeneous Condition 4, the order of the average ratings of the 
altruist and the normal workers was likewise reversed (relative to the also heterogeneous Condition 3). 
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In an ANOVA a significant effect of the Workers factor was found in C4 (PST, F(4, 26) = 15.47, p < 
.001); and contrasts show that the altruist was rated significantly higher than even the normal worker, 
who was rated highest (p < .001). Although the mean ratings for the other normal workers, at least in 
Phase 4, are in the order that is optimal (NW1 > NW2 > NW3 > NW4), and an ANOVA without the 
altruist reaches significance (PST, F(4, 27) = 3.62, p = .02), only one Bonferroni-corrected post hoc 
comparison between normal workers (the one that is expected to differ most: NW1-NW4) led to 
significant results (p < .05). In sum, despite clearly detecting that the altruist has a greater effect on the 
overall output in the global-only conditions, participants show a reduced ability to distinguish between 
the normal workers. 
 
Figure 9. Percentage of participants choosing a normal worker (N) or the altruist worker (A) as 
overall of highest (Panel A) or lowest (Panel B) utility for the company in the final phase (after 80 
rounds) in Conditions C1, C2, C3, C4 of Experiment 2. The choices that correspond to individual 
earnings are marked in black; those that correspond to overall earnings in medium gray. 
 
Figure 9 shows the proportion of ‘managers’ choosing a particular worker to have the “highest” 
(Panel A) or “lowest” (Panel B) “total utility for the company” in the final test phase. The utility 
attributions differ systematically, particularly between the global-and-local conditions (C1 and C3) and 
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the new global-only conditions (C2 and C4). In the homogeneous global-and-local Condition 1, even 
after 80 rounds a majority (83 %) selected a normal worker rather than the altruist as being of the 
highest utility (Panel A). This was not statistically significant (testing against the Null hypothesis of 
random selection), but this test cannot differentiate between random choice and systematic 4 to 1 
preference of regular workers over the altruist. However, in the same condition a majority of 
participants (80 %) judged the altruist to be of the lowest utility for the company and this choice highly 
reliably differed from random selection, χ2(1, N = 30) = 67.50,  p < .001 (Panel B). In homogeneous 
global-only Condition 2, by contrast, a majority of the participants (93%) selected the altruist rather 
than a normal worker to be of the highest utility (χ2(1, N = 28) = 92.89, p < .001). In the heterogeneous 
global-and-local Condition 3, a majority (81 %) judged the individually optimal normal worker N1 to 
be of the highest utility, with N1 being selected reliably most often (χ2(1, N = 32) = 72.03, p < .001). In 
contrast, the altruist, the overall most useful worker, is most frequently judged as of the lowest total 
utility for the company (69 %), χ2(1, N = 32) = 47.53, p < .001. In the heterogeneous global-only 
Condition 4, in contrast to Condition 3, a majority of participants (87 %) selected the altruist to be the 
most useful (χ2(1, N = 32) = 91.13, p < .001), and a majority (53 %) even selected the specific normal 
worker with the lowest individual utility (NW4) to be of the lowest overall utility to the company (χ2(1, 
N = 32) = 21.95, p < .001), suggesting at least some remaining sensitivity on the individual level.  
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Figure 10. The results of the personnel selection task in the four test phases of Experiment 2 show 
the proportion of ‘managers’ choosing a particular team (four out of five), thus excluding either worker 
N1, N2, N3, N4, or altruist worker A. In the global-and-local conditions C1 and C3, the black columns 
correspond to the predicted selections based on individual performance only.  In the global-only 
conditions, C2 and C4, no individual-level information was available. In all conditions, the medium 
gray columns represent the optimal selection(s) based on overall past performance of teams. 
 
Finally, Figure 10 presents the team selections in the personnel selection task, a kind of task that 
most clearly emphasizes the importance of the team as a whole. The team earnings observed by the 
participants in all conditions were consistently the highest for teams with the altruist. In the 
homogeneous, local-and-global Condition 1, we nonetheless replicated a strong tendency to select the 
specific team without the altruist (from five possible configurations). Even in Phase 4, after 80 rounds, 
70% of the participants selected this team, which is clearly above chance, χ2(1, N = 30) = 46.88, p < 
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.001. This selection was reduced from 80% in Phase 1 to 70% in Phase 4, but the change was not 
reliable, χ2(1, N = 60) = .80, p = .371. In contrast, the homogeneous global-only Condition 2 shows that 
participants provided with global-only information were highly capable of quickly detecting the altruist 
should be part of the team. As early as Phase 1, participants reliably selected one of the four with-
altruist teams rather than the no-altruist team, χ2(1, N = 28) = 7.00, p < .001.  Throughout all phases, 
here fewer than 5% selected the without-A team. In addition, statistically the contrast between 
Conditions 1 and 2 was highly significant (tested in Phase 4), χ2(1, N = 58) = 27.15, p < .001.  
In the heterogeneous global-and-local Condition 3, as predicted, selections began with a high 
proportion (78%) of no-altruist team choices in Phase 1 (Figure 10), χ2(1, N = 32) = 67.57, p < .001. In 
Phase 4, these individual-related selections, which exclude A, are likewise found to be above chance 
(59%), χ2(1, N = 32) = 31.01, p < .001; but now the group-related selections  are above chance as well 
(“without N4”, with 34%); χ2(1, N = 32) = 4.13, p = .042. In contrast, in the global-only Condition 4 
(also heterogeneous), even in Phase 1 the optimal team-related selection (the with-altruist team 
excluding N4) is the most frequently selected (43 %), χ2(1, N = 32) = 11.28, p < .001; and the without-
altruist team, by contrast, is selected even significantly below chance (3 %), χ2(1, N = 32) = 5.70, p = 
.017. In Phase 4, the selection of the individually optimal no-altruist team (“without A”) is still selected 
with low relative frequency (3 %), and the overall optimal team (N4) by 59 % of participants. If one 
compares the two heterogeneous conditions, Condition 4 and Condition 3 (Phase 4), the proportion of 
the “without-altruist” team selections, is significantly reduced in Condition 4, χ2(1, N = 64) = 23.56, p 
< .001; and the selection of the team with the altruist that also involves the optimal normal worker 
(despite the absence of information on the individual level), is selected significantly more frequently, 
χ2(1, N = 64) = 4.02, p = .045.  
Additionally, participants’ comments were again coded if showing insight into differences between 
an individual’s direct and overall earnings (individual versus group level) or into interactions between 
Ignorance of Group-Level Effects   47 
 
workers. This measure is only reasonably calculated for local-and-global conditions, where conflicting 
information on both levels was provided. After 80 learning rounds, at least 38% of the participants in 
these conditions were classified as providing such insightful comments (33% in Condition 1 and 43% 
in Condition 3). Of these participants, 87% selected the altruist in the personnel selection task (in the 
same Phase 4), whereas of the participants not demonstrating insight only 3% made this selection. 
Correspondingly, insight correlated highly and reliably with putting the altruist on the team in Phase 4 
(rφ = .86, p < .001), but also in Phase 3 (rφ = .72, p < .001), Phase 2 ((rφ = .55, p < .001) and, to some 
extent, perhaps, in Phase 1 (rφ = .24, p = .06). Additionally, the results suggest that once participants 
recognized the value of A they mostly tended to continue to include A in the team. With respect to the 
rating tasks, we also found that insight correlated reliably, although somewhat less strongly, with 
whether altruists were rated higher than all other workers (Phase 4, rφ = .38, p = .006; Phase 3, rφ = .38, 
p < .006; Phase 2, rφ = .23, p = .146; Phase 1, rφ = .04, p = 1.000), and with whether the altruist was 
rated higher than at least one other worker (Phase 4, rφ = .58, p < .001; Phase 3, rφ = .44, p = .001; 
Phase 2, rφ = .33, p = .019; Phase 1, rφ = .11, p = .513). Whereas the altruist is detected by a large 
proportion of participants in the global-only condition early on, we see that in the local-and-global 
condition, optimal answers on the global level are less frequent but correct group-level ratings were 
correlated relatively early on with later stated insight. 
Finally, with regard to the three additional tests, the correlation between insightful comments and a 
global-perception preference in the Kimchi-Palmer test did not reach significance, rφ = .16, p = .26; and 
insight did not reliably correlate with the correct solution (61%) in the attention test,  rφ = –.05, p = 
.791. Nevertheless, participants with insightful comments showed higher average values in the Need 
for Cognition Scale (NFC, 2.6 vs. 10.5), t(60) = 1.93, p = .03 (one-tailed), and (b) relatively more 
altruist-selections in the selection task (t(60) = 2.64, p = .011).  
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 show, on the one hand, that the suggested ‘tragedy of personnel selection’ 
is quite stable even over 80 rounds although the level of insight seems somewhat higher than in 
Experiment 1a. This stability revealed itself despite investigating again strong and consistent effects of 
the altruist, relatively low number of involved workers, and although we now used 80 rounds. Although 
the results in the conditions with individual-and-group information seem tragic (the majority judges the 
presumably best worker as the worst), it also must be pointed out that about a third of the participants 
even in these conditions showed insight into interactions or individual-versus-group-level differences. 
Likewise, a substantial proportion of participants selected the ‘altruist’ as part of the team. The rating 
task seems somewhat less affected – perhaps because it is formulated more neutrally. Nevertheless, 
insight substantially correlated not only with selecting the altruist in the personnel selection task (r 
=.72), but also with analogous rating patterns (r = .53). Although insightful comments did not correlate 
with a global perception style (mini Kimchi-Palmer test) or with the attention test item, the results 
suggest that a higher Need-for-Cognition score is a positive predictor of insight.  
Second, and importantly, in conditions in which participants were forced to focus on the group level, 
they could quickly detect that the presence of the altruist was correlated to the best outcomes on the 
group level. Thus it can be excluded that people are unable to detect such correlations. In the new 
global-only conditions (C2 and C4), participants were shown in principle to be even highly capable of 
seeing that the altruist had the strongest impact on the overall earnings of the group when they 
concentrated on the group-level information. Here correct group-level answers in both tasks were 
dominant even in the first test phase. The results are reminiscent of those concerning people’s 
performance after either group feedback or group-and-individual feedback, where it emerged that 
people who obtained individual and group feedback were unable to capitalize on this multiple-goal 
Ignorance of Group-Level Effects   49 
 
feedback (DeShon et al., 2004). However, we were here concerned with the different task that 
participants were not cast as individual workers, but rather as neutral human resource managers, 
excluding motivational conflicts. Participants in this role obtained overview data on both the individual 
and the group level or only on the group level and had to evaluate the workers.  
The results strongly suggests that the detected lack of sensitivity to group-level information in this 
and previous experiments could not be due to a general inability to see such correlations, but rather – at 
least for the majority of participants – to a tendency to focus on this information if information on 
individual earnings was available. The pace at which people were able to learn the overall correlation 
even within 20 rounds suggests that spending only a quarter of the time on this level of analysis would 
have been enough to determine this correlation.  
Nonetheless, the results show that most participants in the global-and-individual condition did not 
detect this correlation and presumably did not take into account the possibility that the global and 
individual impact of a worker may differ, even if would have been able to detect the correlation. 
General Discussion 
Findings  
The experiments presented here were two-level personnel evaluation tasks (T-PETs) involving 
information provided at individual and group levels. Specifically, they examined the evaluation or 
selection of single individuals who interacted positively (negatively) with all other workers giving rise 
to strong positive (negative) overall effects on a team’s performance at the group level, that were at 
odds with their individual level contributions.  Faced with opposing effects on the individual and group 
levels, participants’ focus seemed to be on direct individual contributions rather than on overall 
contribution to a team. 
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that a clear majority of T-PET participants evaluated workers based on 
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their individual earnings alone, without considering the higher overall contribution to the earnings of 
the group made by the ‘interactors’, and did so in all conditions examined. Experiment 1a on ‘altruist’ 
detection (or ‘facilitator’ detection), in keeping with the pilot study, showed that judgments failed to 
reflect the strong group-level effects or even a combination of both the group-level and individual-level 
effects, but instead remained mostly focused on the individual level. Despite frequently completely 
ignoring the large group-level effects of the ‘altruist’, participants were mostly able to distinguish small 
performance differences on the individual level. At the same time, the ‘altruist’-detection rate, did not 
seem substantially dependent on the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the normal workers. Moreover, 
the tendency to evaluate the group-serving ‘altruist’ as least well performing, was established by 
participants early on and remained stable throughout the task even though they were asked to 
repeatedly rate and select employees four times. Finally, even the personnel-selection tasks, which 
explicitly asked participants to assemble the best teams and thus might have focused participants on the 
overall team-earnings, mostly saw the best team player excluded from those teams.  
In Experiment 1b the ‘interactor’ had a negative impact on group performance (strongly lowering 
their performance), while individually displaying the best performance, thus behaviourally displaying a 
kind of ‘egotism’. ‘Egoist’ detection was likewise affected by a tragic inability to appreciate the group 
level, with participants ignoring  the large negative correlation between the egoist’s presence and the 
team’s overall performance. Once again, this deficit was accompanied by participant ability to detect 
much smaller performance differences at the individual level, indicating that it is not a lack of 
sensitivity to variation per se that drives these results.  The detection of ‘egoists’ seems reminiscent of 
‘cheater detection’, so that a past literature on the latter might have led one to expect greater sensitivity 
to ‘egoists’ than to ‘altruists’. However, we found only a slight advantage for egoist detection over 
altruist detection, suggesting that there is no strong preference of the one over the other which could 
have explained the phenomenon (Cosmides, 1989; Sperber & Girotto, 2002; von Sydow, 2006). 
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One possible explanation of our results could have been that participants are simply unable to detect 
group level correlations. However, Experiment 2 explicitly investigate whether and how quickly 
participants were able to detect the altruist’s overall effect on the group’s performance when forced to 
focus on group-level information only. In the absence of individual information, participants were 
clearly able to detect altruists. In fact, they mostly evaluated the altruist as the best employee, often 
selecting him or her for the team. Surprisingly, participants showed this as early as in the first test 
phase (after 20 trials). This shows that participants across our studies could have easily detected the 
correlation in a fraction of the available time and using this information is, in principle, well within 
their grasp. Hence the majority’s failure to use this correlation must have other reasons – for instance 
because they simply do not consider the possibility that this team-level information might be important 
and differ from the individual-level information.  
Likewise, a number of methodological concerns or limitations of the paradigm, such as lack of 
concentration or motivation can be ruled out:  poor performance obtained, even though participants had 
repeated test phases and 80 learning trials, and were exposed to only five possible group configurations 
(teams of four out of five employees). In addition, our strict selection criteria for participants, the high 
sensitivity of participants to small individual differences (documented both in Experiment 1a/b and 
Experiment 2) that were considerably smaller than the overlooked group effects, and the result that our 
short final attention test did not reliably correlate with judgments related to overall (group-level) 
effects, seem to exclude lack of concentration as an explanation. This points to a substantive deficit that 
should be of genuine theoretical and practical concern. We consider a number of possible explanations 
for this inability to factor in group-level information appropriately below.  
Before doing so, however, it must be stressed that a relevant minority in all experiments did provide 
evaluations, selections, and comments revealing that they clearly detected the crucial importance of the 
individually weak ‘altruist’ for overall group performance. Several of these participants commented 
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that it was a surprising insight for them that both levels may differ, and most took this insight into 
account in their judgments and selections.  
Implications 
Our results suggest that we may be facing a ‘tragedy of personnel evaluation’ (and of personnel 
selection), in that evaluations often exclusively based on individual performance may not reflect who is 
best for a team’s performance. This may lead to both suboptimal evaluations and inefficient selection 
decisions. In our experiments this is demonstrated by the fact that employees who contributed the most 
to a team’s performance overall were systematically evaluated most negatively and those who contri-
buted the least overall were evaluated most positively. Even though in the real world differences 
between group-level and individual-level performance may often be less pronounced, and the 
individually best employee may even be the one who is best for the group, there is no guarantee that 
individual and group factors will always work in parallel. Moreover, smaller differences will be even 
harder to detect, yet may still easily be large enough to have measurable impact on organisations.  
Although the boundary conditions of the observed phenomenon need to be explored in future, the tragic 
outcomes, observed here in the laboratory, warn of the danger of potentially tragic personnel selection 
in the real world as well.  
One supporting reason is that, as reviewed in the Introduction, altruistic (or prosocial) as well as 
egoistic (or antisocial) interactions with others are central aspects of human behaviour in groups 
(Engel, 2011; Fiddick, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2000; Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Henrich et al., 2005; Nowak 
& Sigmund, 1998, 2005; Post, 2005; Rand et al., 2009; Sober & Wilson, 1999; von Sydow, 2006; 
Wilson & Wilson, 2007); and, more specifically, that various positive and negative interactions 
between individuals or of individuals within whole groups are crucial to the performance of teams, 
organizations and companies (Brief & Motowidlo, 1986; Li, Kirkman, & Potter, 2014; Mathieu et al., 
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2008, 2014; Memmert et al., 2015; Nielsen et al., 2009; Organ & Ryan, 1995; Pearce & Herbik, 2004; 
Podsakoff et al., 2009, 2010; van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996). Although we found small differences 
between altruist and egoist detection and at least some detection of ‘interactors’, and others found some 
weak indications of positive evaluation of positive interactors or ‘facilitators’ (see discussion below), 
our results seem to indicate substantial problems in detecting and appropriately evaluating interactors. 
Given the ubiquity and importance of interactions between members of teams the observed tragic 
effects may well have high significance. 
Although the current findings only show ‘tragic results’ in a laboratory setting, they warn that an 
unreflective use of number-based employee evaluation by managers may lead to sub-optimal outcomes. 
Thinking of group dynamics may require more subtle attentiveness on the part of personnel managers, 
but the overall yield may well warrant the effort. 
To sum up, our results point out the need for managers to be aware of the difference between 
individual-level and group-level effects when evaluating employees working in teams. The paradoxical 
two-level nature of team performance studied here was only understood by a minority of participants 
who showed insight into the difference between individual-level and group-level performance and 
tended to select teams who had the best overall outcome. They in fact often described experiencing an 
“Aha” (or Eureka) moment. The possibility of such insight provides hope of further understanding of 
human state- or trait-variables and task or content factors facilitating such insight. Here we have just 
begun our investigation; and in fact we found that insightful comments made by the participants did not 
significantly correlate with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005, in the pre-test), nor 
with a Kimchi-Palmer test item (Kimchi & Palmer, 1982), or a simple attention task. Indeed, our results 
suggested that, as hypothesized, people with high “Need-for-Cognition” values (Cacioppo, Petty, & 
Kao, 1984) may provide more insightful comments.  
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Limitations and Future Avenues of Research  
The main goal of the present article is to point out that, given our demonstration of potential tragedy 
in personnel evaluation there is need for future avenues of research to help determine (1) the domains 
of application and boundary conditions, (2) potential mediating mechanisms, and (3) ways to mitigate 
the disastrous results.  
(1) Future work needs to further clarify the boundary conditions of the reported phenomenon, 
particularly with respect to real world contexts. Since interactions between employees are almost 
ubiquitous in real-world scenarios, and individual-level and team-level effects need not have the same 
strength or direction, the present evidence suggests that a tragedy of personnel selection may well take 
place in real-life scenarios as well. However, whether, how far and under which conditions this is really 
the case needs to be explored. It would be interesting to explore, for instance, the following issues. 
(a) Does the tragic group-level neglect occur also for other data patterns as well? As discussed 
above, it seems plausible that similar phenomena occur with less clear dissociations of individual and 
group effects or in more complex situations, with both being presumably much more frequent. 
However, we here modelled the interaction of general altruists’ (or egoists’) interacting unconditionally 
with all others. This is in line with central literature on altruism (e.g., Sober & Wilson, 1999; Wilson & 
Wilson, 2007) and with the idea of the importance of general team-level or unit-level influences (cf. 
Mathieu, Maynard, Rapp, & Gilson, 2008; Chen & Kanfer, 2006; Chen et al., 2013); but it needs to be 
investigated how far these findings fully or partly generalize to other kinds of more specific 
interactions or the evaluation of even smaller teams.  
(b) Since we did not find effects based on level of formal education, the results seem to be quite 
general (apart from the Need for Cognition test). Although it therefore seems implausible that 
personnel managers are totally immune to the strong effects documented here, it would be interesting to 
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explore whether samples of real personnel managers would demonstrate different effects. 
(c) Our present findings used number-based personnel evaluations and personnel selections only. 
Perhaps the explored group-level neglect or interaction-neglect may occur less frequently or even 
disappear when people have not quantitative but qualitative information at hand. The research on 
effects of (extra-role) altruistic behavior on evaluations at least suggests that the neglect in such 
domains is not complete (Organ, 1997; Scotter, Cross, & Motowidlo, 2000; Grant & Patil, 2012, 562). 
This may partly be due to not investigating situations with clearly conflicting individual and group-
level performance. The recognition of group effects may also still be underestimated in these more 
positive reports (but number-based T-PETs may particularly well be suited to investigate the exact 
weighting of such effects). In real life, managers may also use cues instead of performance information, 
since for instance people are often known to choose their social partners based on qualitative cues 
indicating moral aspects of their character (Everett, Pizarro, & Crockett, 2016). Interestingly, a large 
meta-analysis shows that prosocial behaviour (Organizational Citicenship Behavior, OCB) is positively 
correlated with employee’s performance ratings and also weaker with actual reward allocation 
(Podskoff et al., 2009). However, for our purpose it would not only be important to know which aspect 
of OCB elicited these effects, but also whether the effects are due to group-performance detection at 
all, or rather to taking OCB behaviour as a proxy for good performance on the individual or group 
level. The apparent correlation between individual performance and facilitation of the team's 
performance (Podskoff et al., 2009) may ,mitigate the tragic results found. Finally, even if it remains 
well possible that underweighting of group-level effects occurs even in less abstract settings, it also 
seems plausible to us, prima facie, that managers who work in direct contact with their teams and the 
involved work processes may less be prone to fall prey to such neglect. These questions require closer 
investigation; but the increasing role of number- and outcome-based evaluations conducted from far, 
instead of by senior-level managers in close contact to the team, suggest an increasing neglect (or 
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underweighting) of group-level effects in real-world personnel evaluation as well.  
(d) The evaluation-context used in our experiments may have elicited a context of competition and 
self-interest (Grant & Patil, 2012). This would be in accordance with the finding that providing 
feedback about the earnings of peers reduces acts of altruistic punishment in public-good games 
(Nikiforakis, 2010). Experiment 1b, however, shows that substantial negative interaction with other 
workers (i.e., ‘egoist detection’) was almost as difficult for the participants to assess. Nonetheless, a 
variant of this idea, which one may call ‘functional binding,’ may apply. Classic personnel selection 
rested almost exclusively on individual-level assessments; thus the way personnel evaluation and 
selection is done traditionally may serve as an individualist standard even if information on both the 
individual and team levels was provided.  An individualist context may have prevented participants 
from considering both altruistic and egoistic interactions in the team; thus future research should 
investigate whether and how contexts may change the experiment-outcomes.  
(e) Even if the tragic findings arise similarly for situations described here, where the composition of 
the optimal team is known based on full information about the performance of each possible 
constellation, future research needs to investigate situations where teams have to be build anew. Here 
the issue arises about the generality and transferability of altruistic or egoistic behavior or, more 
generally, of facilitating/inhibiting effects. Perhaps in such situations it would be easier to train teams 
to work cooperatively than selecting an optimal team. We think that it would be worthwhile to 
investigate these issues in the future.  
Although the degree to which our findings can be generalized may depend on a wealth of factors, 
our results point to a pressing need. Just as evolutionary biologists should never confuse individual 
with inclusive fitness, managers must be aware of the dangers of confusing individual performance 
with an individual’s overall (or inclusive) effect on a team.  
(2) We are now going to discuss further potential explanatory mechanisms. The discovered potential 
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tragedy of personnel evaluation may be based on quite general cognitive mechanisms. Here we have 
shown that altruist and egoist selections lead to what is at least a similar neglect of the interactor, and 
that we cannot attribute it to specific problems of altruist detection alone (cf. Cosmides, 1989; Sperber 
& Girotto, 2002; von Sydow, 2006; cf. Discussion of Experiment 1). Moreover, we have shown that 
this group-level neglect could not be attributed to a complete inability to detect correlations between 
the presence of certain employees and the overall earnings (Experiment 2). However, there are several 
factors and processes that may lead people not to assess this correlation. The tragedy may, for instance, 
be related to (a) problems of detecting interaction effects (Novick & Cheng, 2004), even though people 
may well to be able to detect trivariate causal relationships (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001; Meder, 
Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008), bivariate correlations (McKenzie & Mikkelsen, 2007) or 
probabilistic-logical patterns (von Sydow, 2011, 2016, 2017); (b) a difficulty realizing that many small 
externalities can add up to large payoffs (Dörner, 1989/1993; von Sydow, 2015); or (c) problems 
dealing with multilevel representations and with the Simpson’s paradox (Fiedler, Walther, Freytag, & 
Nickel, 2003; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001; von Sydow, Hagmayer, & Meder, 2016). These general 
explanations may relate to and be of importance for several fields of basic research, such as causal 
induction, induction of correlations, complex problem solving or dynamic decision theory (Funke, 
2001, 2014; Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008; Osman, 2010; Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001). A 
disentangling of these potential and perhaps supplementary causes of our tragic results would certainly 
be a reasonable focus of future research. 
In connection with an elaboration of such explanations, one might question, given our results, the 
assumption of the optimality of selecting teams that in previous rounds showed the highest overall 
performance. Indeed, in several central domains of cognitive science a number of known deviations 
from normative standards have led not only to suggestions that people are fundamentally biased, but 
also to alternative normative standards (for instance, in hypothesis testing, argumentation, or 
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probability judgment; Fiedler & von Sydow, 2015, Gigerenzer, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Hahn 
& Oaksford, 2007; Hertwig & Volz, 2013; von Sydow, 2011, 2016). Nonetheless, it seems difficult to 
question and almost a truism that seeking the best team requires examining the best configuration of 
employees in the past. It seems self-evident to choose the option with the best expected outcome. We 
pointed out that a neglect of positive or negative group effects of interactors (for instance altruistic 
cooperators or egoistic defectors) in evaluation contexts may have disastrous effects for companies and 
organisations. Moreover, our relatively simple task as well as the results of Experiment 2 strongly 
suggests that people are in principle cognitively able to detect interactors quickly based on the strong 
grouplevel correlations shown.  
Nonetheless, it may in some sense be reasonable that participants did not use this information but 
perhaps aimed at a more detailed understanding of the problem than merely choosing the overall best 
of five teams. First, in many situations the sole analysis of individual contributions is a reasonable goal, 
and this may have prevented people from assessing overall team performance (including effects of 
interactions between individuals). Second, this may be linked to the perspective of causal decision 
making, emphasizing not only correlations but also causal pathways (Waldmann & Hagmayer, 2001, 
Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2006; Sloman & Hagmayer, 2006; Hagmayer & Meder, 
2012; von Sydow et al., 2016). With this perspective the tragedy may be a clearly negative – or 
disastrous – side effect of an otherwise reasonable strategy to construct local pathways (von Sydow et 
al., 2016; cf. also Hebbelmann & von Sydow, 2017). Participants in the studied T-PETs may perhaps 
have tried to obtain process knowledge by exploring positive or negative effects of employees on other 
individual employees. Although in these tasks even the effects of the altruist on each single individual 
employee were greater than the generally detected smallest individual difference between normal 
employees, they were smaller than the greatest individual difference across employees. If people have 
tried to construct a causal (or logical) network of local relationships rather than detect the massive 
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overall correlation of altruist and overall outcome, this task becomes more difficult and may 
substantially contribute to neglecting the positive effects of the “altruist”. This does not change the fact 
that a resultant neglect of an overall impact is false or even disastrous in terms of non-causal as well as 
causal decision making. However, the latter perspective may perhaps shed light on rational forces 
underlying these disastrous effects for personnel evaluation. 
(3) Finally, from an applied perspective it would be interesting to explore conditions that might help 
to mitigate the neglect of group-level effects which seems disastrous in the reported experiments. The 
insightful solutions, at least by a substantial minority, show that the task is solvable; and the results of 
Experiment 2 show that people can quickly find the best group solution if focusing on group-level 
information alone. For instance, our results suggest that, ceteris paribus, an increased focus on the 
group-level may mitigate the current disastrous findings, perhaps at the price of lowering the high 
resolution at the level of individual performance.9 To summarise, stressing the role of interaction in the 
instructions; stressing the role of teams in the culture of companies; using team-selection tasks without 
any evaluation task; and comparing several groups, perhaps together with stressing the importance of 
the teams, may help improve the evaluations and team selections. 
Conclusion 
Independent of the significance of further clarifications and investigations of the details of the 
processes involved and of exact boundary conditions, the practical importance of pointing out the 
danger of overlooking group-serving or group-harming employees and building inefficient teams 
                                                 
9 In some more recent studies, however, we show that using two groups may indeed strengthen the group-level focus, but that this is 
not sufficient to truly overcome the tendency to focus on individuals (preliminary report in von Sydow & Braus, 2017, and von Sydow, 
Braus, & Hahn, 2017). 
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(based only on individual excellence) can hardly be overestimated, with regard to companies and other 
organizations.  Overall, our findings underline a necessary awareness of the danger of a tragedy of 
personnel evaluation in the real world, with implications for incentive-structures (personnel 
evaluation), employee-advancement (personnel promotion) and job offers (personnel selection). 
Pointing out this problem may help find ways to overcome and even prevent it. 
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